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Abstract. Privacy impacts of video surveillance systems are a major
concern. This paper presents our ongoing multidisciplinary approach to
integrate privacy concerns in the design of video surveillance systems. The
project aims at establishing a reference framework for the collection of
privacy concepts and principles, the description of surveillance contexts,
surveillance technologies, and accountability capabilities.
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1 Introduction
Despite contested views on its usefulness [15], video surveillance has been widely
deployed to protect individuals and assets in public and private spaces. Over the
past decades, video surveillance technologies have made tremendous advances,
from analogue closed-circuit television (CCTV) to digital and network-based
systems. State of the art video surveillance systems are labelled as “smart” and
“intelligent”, in which different types of information systems are integrated for
correlating information from multiple sources. For example, biometric systems
can be integrated into video surveillance for individual identification. In addition,
advanced video analytic capabilities enable the system to monitor, detect, and
search objects and events, e.g., for motion, behaviour, and abandoned object
detection. As the systems are often network-based, real-time video streams and
recorded video data can be distributed or remotely accessed using existing network
infrastructure across geographic and organizational boundaries.
Privacy has always been a concern in surveillance systems. A large amount
of work has been carried out in the past, e.g., from political science [21] to
technological solutions [17]. However, the rapid development of technologies
and the increasing market demand for surveillance capabilities outpace the
development of regulations, social norm, and protection mechanisms. As a result,
many areas remain partially or entirely undefined, which poses serious privacy
risks if they are not handled correctly during the system planning, design, and
development phases.
Video surveillance systems can be deployed in disparate contexts and often
integrate subcomponents such as access control, communications, and mission
management systems. Usually the system design process is driven by operational
missions and generic specifications, in which system designers fulfill the technical
and operational specifications. During the design process, many options exist
and numerous decisions must be taken. This makes it demanding to include
and address privacy concerns in the design. For example, perceptions of privacy
vary according to context. Notably, expectations in public spaces are usually
different from expectations in private ones; yet the demarcation between public
and private spaces is sometimes blurry. Accordingly, social, political, and ethical
approaches are required to deal with the complexities of those varying perceptions.
Furthermore, just within Europe, regulations differ considerably even across
member states. Even when only a given country is under consideration, it often
remains difficult to find synthetic information about statutory law or case law
related to specific surveillance scenarios. A parallel challenge is how to make all
the privacy solutions practical, i.e., we must find optimal solutions for individuals’
right to privacy on one side and the public need for safety and (homeland) security
on the other side.
This paper presents our ongoing work on the establishment of a multidisci-
plinary framework that includes privacy concerns in the design of video surveil-
lance systems. Specifically, the framework serves as a foundation for the collection
of concepts and principles and for the description of surveillance context as well
as surveillance technologies and accountability capabilities. It takes into account
views from different stakeholders such as policy makers, regulators, national Data
Protection Authorities, law enforcement, public authorities, and video surveillance
system providers and operators. The framework is envisioned to help designers
and other stakeholders facing these complexities to create video surveillance
systems taking into account privacy requirements in a methodological, principled,
systematic, and accountable way. To this aim, the framework provides reusable,
generic and synthetic guidelines, reference information and criteria to be used or
modified by experts and other stakeholders.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We describe the privacy
challenges and motivate the need for a multidisciplinary framework in § 2. We
then give an overview of our approach and the rationales in § 3. The framework
and its associated processes are presented in § 4 and § 5, respectively, followed
by a summary in § 6.
2 Privacy Challenges and Motivations for Developing a
Framework
Privacy is multifaceted, subjective, and evolving. The definition and perception
of public and private spaces are constantly shaped under social, political, legal,
and cultural influences. Therefore, a consistent basis is needed for describing
the context concerning the balance between privacy and surveillance. Otherwise,
it is difficult to determine the nature of personal and sensitive information in
the surveillance context. Even though privacy can be seen from many angles,
we base our analysis on the Seven Types of Privacy taxonomy [13], a recent
framework (published in 2013) broadening the definition of privacy to account
for novel threats introduced by technologies such as surveillance systems. This
taxonomy enumerates the following categories: the privacy of the person, privacy
of behaviour and action, privacy of communication, privacy of data and image,
privacy of thoughts and feelings, privacy of location and space and privacy of
association. While we also included more technical perspectives on privacy in our
literature review, the above taxonomy provides a comprehensive categorization
independently of specific practical measures to counteract privacy threats.
A chief challenge to video surveillance is the tension between surveillance
functionality and privacy. Modern computer vision algorithms are capable of
transforming and masking regions of video images that are considered private [10].
However, the willingness of surveillance operators to embrace these solutions in
their systems and their effectiveness to protect privacy in systems with multiple
information sources are still questionable. Besides, the reliability of these privacy
protection components in large scale surveillance systems are yet to be proved.
Surveillance systems are not much different from other IT systems that have
various potential risks. Any data breach resulting from accidental disclosure or
from a malicious attack will have an impact on privacy as well. To make the
matter more complex, the trend in surveillance systems is towards multi-model
and multi-operator system with increasing system interoperability, which leads
to higher co-operation and exchange of information at the organizational level as
well as at the system level.
Another challenge to privacy is the imbalance of power between citizens and
surveillance system owners, introduced by the massive collection of personal data
by surveillance system owners in an opaque way. The lack of knowledge about
what is recorded and the absence of an individualised relation with controllers
put data subjects in an overly weak position. Because of their inherent opacity,
surveillance systems cannot rely on informed consent to legitimate personal data
processing. Therefore, data subjects can only rely on ex post protection, i.e.,
complaints and redress procedures. Such protection often come too late and is
uncertain in its outcome.
Costs can also be a challenge if alterations or extensions required to support
privacy in a system are significant and expensive. Adopting a privacy-by-design
approach and taking into account such requirements early on in system design
can mitigate this issue.
The number of entities generally involved in surveillance systems yield addi-
tional difficulties. Numerous interacting entities generate a multitude of commu-
nication channels, often carrying sensitive data. This imbalance and complexity
motivate the need to increase the accountability obligations of data controllers
for their data processing. By accountability [9], we do not merely mean legal
compliance but (1) the demonstration and verifiability of compliance at all levels
through transparency about policies, actual processing and the explicit definition
of technical compliance and (2) the possibility for an independent third party to
actually check the evidence of both legal and technical compliance (e.g., procedure
documentation and audit logs). A good definition of the spirit of accountability
can be found in an Article 29 Working Group’s Opinion [6], which affirms in
particular accountability’s role of “showing how responsibility is exercised and
making this verifiable”. Rather than a part of privacy, we consider accountability
as a principle and a set of tools that can be used to support it.
While it could be argued that the inherent imbalance of power in any surveil-
lance system brings an ethical obligation upon data controllers to act in a
transparent way towards data subjects, the upcoming European General Data
Protection Regulation [12] introduces a legal obligation to be able to demonstrate
compliance with the data protection framework. This obligation goes through the
implementation of adequate policies, procedures and technical measures tending
to evidence compliance. Therefore, data subjects or their representatives are owed
“accounts”, but this is not sufficient; this evidence of the actions of controllers must
be analysed and the conclusions of legal and technical compliance checking made
available. The regulation foresees that assurance is provided through internal
or external audit and legal compliance checked by Data Protection Authorities.
However, in terms of technical compliance, both the accounts and the obligations
against which they are to be verified often remain vague, impeding meaningful
analysis and the reaching of clear conclusions. Furthermore, technical compli-
ance checking on the system level, if it is not completed by links to higher-level
principles, may seem excessively technical or disconnected from the big picture
to stakeholders. A framework with sufficient generality is therefore needed to
integrate the technical and high-level aspects of accountability into a unified
approach.
2.1 Existing Work on Privacy and Video Surveillance
Existing research work addresses privacy from either social or computer science
perspective, or the combination of both. In recent years, the European Commis-
sion funded a number of research projects that touch upon privacy and ethics
of surveillance systems. The IRISS project [1] looks at the impact of surveil-
lance technologies on basic rights and their social and economic influences. The
SAPIENT project [3] aims at developing a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA)
methodology for surveillance technology. The SurPRISE project [4] assesses
criteria and factors influencing European citizens’ acceptance of surveillance
technology. VideoSense [5] works on privacy preserving video analytics.
Existing solutions fostering accountability include PIA [22]. PIA forces data
controllers not only to identify the impact the system developed will have on
privacy and implement the necessary safeguards, but also to ensure that com-
pliance with the legal framework is ensured throughout the whole lifecycle of
the system which means allocating responsibilities for compliance between the
different actors and implementing the required procedures to provide regular
reviews and assurance.
PIA should integrate accountability as a system design prerequisite to ensure
obligations are fulfilled. In particular, accountability over actual data handling
practices is important to increase transparency regarding real system activity.
This aspect is often neglected in PIA, yet seems essential to take into account
accountability requirements. Even though checks related to accountability are
not always part of PIA, adequate technical tools already exist. Available means
to achieve this accountability of practice include privacy policy languages such
as EPAL [7] or PPL [20], which allow the precise specification of (technical)
data handling policies. These standardised policies can then be used to analyze
system operation traces (audit logs) through a posteriori technical compliance
control [8, 11].
Many technical solutions have surfaced addressing the privacy issue along
the line of software, hardware, and system architecture. For example, digital
signal processors can be embedded in the so-called “smart cameras”, which are
then programmed to selectively de-identify, mask, or scramble a certain region in
the video [10]. The access to the raw video data is limited. Instead, metadata
is used to fulfill the requirement of the surveillance operators. Therefore, video
data from the smart cameras is split into two streams: a metadata stream for
describing objects, events, behaviour, and other situations in the video; and an
image stream which is the original video data.
Senior et al. [18] proposed to foster privacy through a layered access model
enforced by a multilevel access control system architecture. The access model
derives access rights from the following questions: (1) what data is present, (2)
has the subject given consent, (3) what form does the data take, (4) who sees
the data, (5) how long is data kept, and (6) how raw is the data. The answers to
these questions lead to a layered access model. The raw video stream is further
processed, and information is extracted to generate versions of different image
details. For example, the access model can include three layers for three types
of users: ordinary users can only access statistical information, privileged users
can access limited individual information, and law enforcement agencies can
access raw video information. For privacy protection, video data are rendered to
transform a person’s image into a bar, a box, or only its silhouette. Commercial
systems such as IBM Smart Surveillance Solutions [16] claim to feature video
analytics-based privacy protection mechanisms, including the limitation of access
to camera and functions, information extraction from videos, and fuzzy metadata
representation.
3 The SALT Approach
The previous section shows that systematically addressing privacy in video
surveillance systems requires careful considerations from multiple perspectives.
To include privacy from the very beginning of a video surveillance project is
crucial for ensuring privacy after the system is deployed and operated, until it
is decommissioned. Designers are challenged by choices reflecting concerns from
various aspects. Therefore, in order to include privacy in the design of video
surveillance systems, a methodological approach is required to systematically
address multidisciplinary concerns.
We aim at ensuring that the designed system supports both public security
interests and minimal impact on individuals’ privacy. Accountability mechanisms
are further given specific attention to increase transparency and help reinforcing
citizen rights in a surveillance society (or faced with surveillance systems). To
achieve these goals, a methodology is defined based on a two-step process:
1. System owners9 are first guided through a reflexive process to assess the
legal/socio-contextual10 and ethical opportunity of the system envisioned, i.e.
to assess the necessity and proportionality of the technology in relation to the
stated purposes. Assessment of the impact on individuals’ privacy as framed
under the Seven Types of Privacy terminology [13] is a key at that stage.
This phase could lead to discard, validate or mitigate the options initially
taken.
2. During the design process, designers11 are referred to socio-contextual, ethical
and legal considerations that should be taken into account in order to reduce
the impact of the system on individuals’ privacy. They are presented with
state-of-the-art privacy preserving technologies to mitigate such impact and
with accountability features to increase the level of transparency of the system
and the traceability of the actions performed by such system.
The outcome of these two stages (opportunity assessment and system require-
ments) are documented in order to enable legal validation but also to enhance
the transparency of the decision-making process.
Two pillars are defined to support the methodology:
– A decision support in the form of a knowledge base to assist the understanding
of common concerns in complex and evolving environments and to facilitate
the decision-making process. We identify the social-contextual, ethical, legal,
and technological aspects as the most influential factors in the decision
9 In this paper, system owners are defined as a legal entity (for basic systems, this can
be a person or a group of persons) that has the ownership of the system (meaning
its hardware and software components).
10 We use the word “contextual” to emphasize the need to take into account local (at
the country or regional level) perceptions of privacy and surveillance.
11 We define system designers as the entities producing sufficient, coherent and testable
specifications for a given system.
support, which is referred to as the SALT framework. The SALT framework
is envisioned to provide a guidance for system designers to design and
integrate privacy and accountability into the system and to enforce high level
requirements in technical terms during the product lifecycle. § 4 describes
the SALT framework.
– Processes associated with the SALT framework, which specify what knowledge
should be included in the SALT framework, and how to use the knowledge to
support the design of video surveillance systems that integrate privacy and
accountability from the start, i.e., privacy-by-design and accountability-by-
design. §. 5 describes the processes in details.
4 SALT Framework
The SALT framework is a collection of concepts and overarching principles
concerning privacy including social-contextual, ethical, legal, and technical view-
points. It is envisioned to be a reference for decision support during the design
of video surveillance systems. The present section describes how to collect and
synthesize knowledge from various views into the framework, and how to process
and manage the knowledge in the framework.
4.1 Overview
The SALT framework relies on the SALT management tool, a set of computer
programs that enable a user (a person acting for a surveillance system operator
or a domain expert), to interact with concepts and information stored in the com-
puter. The work on knowledge capture and management in the SALT framework
is inspired from the principles and methods of knowledge engineering, in which
building a knowledge-based system is regarded as a modelling process, i.e., con-
structing computer models for realizing problem-solving capabilities comparable
to the ones of a domain expert [19].
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the SALT framework. It relies on literature
and domain experts as knowledge sources. The literature includes academic
research articles, legal texts, institutional and policy documents, and studies
funded by the European Commission. In addition, a possible extension to the
knowledge source can be the opinions of other stakeholders such as citizens and
relevant associations and organisations. Initially, the domain experts are mainly
the individuals creating the SALT framework. SALT knowledge is selectively
captured in a number of ways that are deemed relevant. In this stage, experts’
effort will be needed to evaluate the relevance of captured knowledge. Since SALT
knowledge comes from different disciplines and individuals, work is also needed
to identify links and synthesize knowledge coherently.
The analysed knowledge is transferred from textual description to defined
models which facilitate the management of captured knowledge. In other words,
models are structured, machine-readable presentations of information related
to privacy and video surveillance. The SALT knowledge repository stores these
models from various sources. The purpose of knowledge application is to assist
system designers to apply the knowledge to solve similar problems in an efficient
and correct way. In other words, given the information on a specific context such
as legal system and surveillance project requirements, one can retrieve tailored
references for decision support in system design phase. This specific information
helps designers to take proper design decisions to develop surveillance systems
and to enforce social, ethical, and legal requirements in technical terms such as





























Fig. 1. Knowledge engineering in SALT framework
As a collection of knowledge from various sources, the SALT framework will
be accessed and edited by different users in a cooperative way. Thus the role of
the SALT management tools is to provide tool support for the creation, edition,
search, and extraction of the knowledge in the SALT framework.
The SALT compliant design process is envisioned to ensure the proportion-
ality of the surveillance purpose and of the system designed, by integrating
privacy requirements into the design process according to the instantiated SALT
framework.
For instance, the aspect of the design process focusing on accountability takes
into account a number of aspects at different levels, involving corresponding disci-
plines. Its overarching goal is to encourage controllers into increased transparency.
At the most general level, enabling accountability requires identifying all entities
involved in the surveillance infrastructure, which data they have access to and
under which conditions. The responsibilities of all actors in terms of protecting
privacy and processing personal data in compliance with the data protection
framework must also be clarified.
For the controller to be able to account for its policy, policies regulating data
users should be transparent to Data Protection Authorities. This involves not
only compliance with the legal framework but also the active demonstration
of links between the privacy policy and the legal obligations to which they
correspond to. This simplifies subsequent verification of legal policy compliance.
In addition, subjects must know what is recorded and which entities can access
which recordings under which conditions. For instance, in some surveillance
systems, massive amounts of recording channels exist with thousands of cameras
deployed in urban areas. Thus multiple control centers are required to handle this
kind of data production, making it extremely complex to identify all data flows,
access authorizations, purposes of the data processing and ultimately to enforce
the internal privacy policy of the organization. In such cases, the importance of
accountability, i.e., of the transparency of the data processing operations as well
as a proper allocation of responsibilities, is vital to mitigate privacy risks.
At a different but equally important level, appropriate procedures must be
implemented. They involve integrating privacy concerns into business processes,
carrying out PIA, appointing a Data Protection Officer who is responsible for
ensuring internal compliance, training staff and carrying out periodic audits.
Finally, policies and procedures should translate into practice. Technical
measures can help data controllers to demonstrate that their practices actually
meet the requirements of the legal framework. In SALT compliant design process,
this involves taking a closer look at the details of the entire data lifecycle, including
the exact nature of recorded data, temporal parameters such as the maximal
duration of storage and storage security (which may use cryptography). Because
data is recorded in public spaces, there can be no one-on-one data handling policy
negotiation between a subject and the controller. Instead, a representative of the
public may defend the interests of individual subjects by globally negotiating
privacy policies during the SALT complaint design process. Some traditional data
protection principles, such as data minimization, may be difficult to apply in
some cases, for instance when images are recorded. However, specific techniques,
for instance the automatic blurring of faces, may be available to promote this
principle. These techniques are a part of the possible design artifacts presented
to system designs.
4.2 SALT Knowledge Management
In the initial phase, the knowledge input of the SALT framework mainly relies
on systematic literature review and guided interview of domain experts. In the
systematic literature review, a team of researchers and engineers from various
disciplines has conducted a breadth-first survey of existing body of knowledge
on privacy and surveillance. The scope of the survey covers psychosocial, social,
political, ethical, legal, and computer engineering topics related to privacy in
surveillance systems. Our literature review also includes topics on accountability-
by-design, privacy-by-design, and PIA [14].
Another source of knowledge input comes from domain experts or other
stakeholders through proactive elicitation. The elicitation process is conducted
and guided by questionnaires. The questionnaires are carefully designed to capture
knowledge related to specific aspects of the SALT framework. For example, our
preliminary questionnaire for eliciting legal knowledge for surveillance systems
include questions in three stages: (1) a preliminary assessment of legitimacy and
overall proportionality of surveillance systems in relation to the stated purpose;
(2) the assessment of surveillance system following Article 29 Working Party
guidance and Directive 95/46 principles; and (3) the assessment of balancing
stricto sensu. The knowledge is captured in an iterative process, i.e., the analysis
of the knowledge acquired will provide additional guidance on how knowledge is
elicited by modifying the structure and content of the questionnaire.
The knowledge in the SALT framework must also be accessed and extended to
account for the evolving nature of privacy concerns. In order to do so in an efficient
and user-friendly way, the knowledge in SALT framework should be machine-
readable, i.e. we need to transfer the knowledge into an appropriate computer
representation such that a computer is able to work on it. The computer-readable
representation of the SALT knowledge can be realised in various ways, depending
on the type of technology and platform chosen. Typical examples include XML,
JSON, or a Wiki-based structure. However, independently of the representation
language and platform, it is important to have a high level definition of the
structure and format of the SALT knowledge. From a computer engineering point
of view, it is analogous to the definition of models for representing and processing
information. In the case of the SALT framework, this model is what we call a
SALT template. Whenever a piece of knowledge is added to the SALT framework,
it follows the structure given by the SALT template, that is, we instantiate the
SALT template according to the knowledge and then we store it. We name the
result a SALT instance or a SALT reference12.
The proposed SALT template must fulfil the following properties: (1) it must
allow to differentiate each particular instance, (2) each instance must be uniquely
identified, (3) it must prove the reliability of the information that it stores, (4) it
must include the key information regarding the privacy or accountability concerns
that it handles, and (5) it must provide a mechanism that allows for storing
information coming from the four different categories, which may need different
ways of handling the information.
In order to achieve these requirements, we have devised the structure depicted
in Fig. 2. A SALT template contains several types of components. At the first
level, it includes the instance information and the content. Instance information is
unique to each SALT instance and is used to differentiate instances. An instance
includes Identification, which identifies the SALT instance, typically an instance
identifier or a version number; and Trust information, which is used to guarantee
SALT information trustfulness. To ensure the integrity and authenticity of the
reference information, trust mechanisms such as digital signatures, authority
identifiers, certifications or trusted-party endorsements can be included. Another
part of a SALT instance is the Content component, which stores the information
related to the actual concerns. The content includes Core information, which
identifies what type of concern is stored within the SALT instance, e.g. concern
identifiers and concern categories, and Extensions, which provides the rationale
and information related to a specific concern. For example, Ethical extension
12 In this paper, “SALT reference” and “SALT instance” will be used interchangeably
since they refer to the same concept but reflect different disciplinary perspectives.
includes information on topics such as types of privacy likely to be impacted by
the surveillance system, stakeholders who need the system, affected individuals’
































Fig. 2. Structure and components of SALT instance
Each new instance will include the information on the origin of the knowledge
and the author(s) of the instance such that the content of the instance can
be checked if necessary. Since decisions on privacy-related issues are results of
specific contexts, such as the case of different interpretations of the same law,
it is possible that there might be overlapping instances. A probable solution
is to provide all related instances to system designers to help them to make a
decision. Since concerns have different levels of specificity, for example, legal
concerns usually depend on specific cases while social concerns can be linked to
more general context, the SALT template is designed to be flexible enough to be
useful for both specific and general cases.
5 SALT Process
Three independent processes are closely associated with the SALT framework
and define how privacy concerns are captured, managed, and applied. The
processes can be divided into two groups according to their purposes: SALT
knowledge building processes and SALT knowledge use process. With SALT
knowledge building processes, we decide what relevant information to take into
account and how to integrate it into the SALT framework. For this purpose, two
different processes are defined: Information acquisition process and Information
representation process. SALT knowledge use process describes how information
gathered by previous processes can be used to guide system designer during the
system design phase. In the context of SALT framework, this process is called
SALTed design process.
5.1 Information Acquisition Process
We define this process to describe how to acquire information for the SALT
framework. Depending on the type of concerns (i.e., socio-contextual, ethical,
legal and technical), there are different methods to gather the information.
Questionnaires Questionnaires are a convenient method for extracting informa-
tion regarding socio-contextual and ethical concerns. Due to the nature of these
concerns, any meaningful result requires to match the knowledge of a sample
group of individuals, which must be big enough in order to be representative
of a population. Therefore, questionnaires, and the subsequent analysis of the
obtained data, are an appropriate method to achieve this task.
Primary sources This method involves the systematic review of documents
and reports for objective information, i.e. information that is less likely to be
influenced by personal and subjective feelings and interpretations. Legal and
technical concerns in the SALT framework are the ones that clearly benefit from
this type of documentation. Numerous legal documents (constitutions, licenses,
proclamations, statements, sureties, tax forms, treaties, etc.) and technical reports
are widely accepted and trusted. They provide objective information and views
to the SALT framework.
Secondary sources Apart from the two previous methods for information
acquisition, domain experts can provide valuable input as a direct result of their
own expertise in the form of personal opinions and decisions that may apply to
ambiguous issues. For example, a lawyer could provide a possible interpretation
of a given law applied to a determined context.
5.2 Information Representation Process
As its name states, this process handles the task of representing the information
acquired from the information acquisition process. The information is modeled
and stored in the knowledge repository. Therefore, the structure and format of
a SALT instance is crucial, since they directly affect to the performance of the
knowledge management. The modeling of a SALT instance is covered in §. 4.2.
5.3 SALTed Design Process
The SALTed design process designates the SALT reference usage process that will
guide system designers in the design of a SALT compliant surveillance system.
SALT compliance signifies that the system design process includes relevant privacy
concerns and follows the guidelines specified by the SALT framework. It starts
from the SALT instances selection and ends with the creation of a system design
specification. The SALTed design process is designed in a way that makes it
likely to be adopted by system designers (usually engineers or other technical
staff) while minimizing interference with existing system design processes and
workflows. Besides, in order to assess the reliability of the content provided by
these experts, an evaluation mechanism might be created in the future to decide
their level of expertise.
Tab. 1 presents use cases related to the SALTed design process. Use cases are
commonly employed by software engineers to visualise a system architecture and
to understand a system’s main functionalities. A use case typically describes the
interactions between an actor and a system. An actor in the use case represents
the role of a user. We use the same approach to describe the various activities
involved in the SALTed design process and the interactions of the users with
the SALT framework. For each use cases, we identify the primary actor and
describe its actions performed in the use case description. Note that the naming
of the actor only reflects a user’s role with respect to the SALT framework from
a software engineering point of view.
Table 1. Use cases related to a SALTed design process
Use case Description Primary actor
SALT template modi-
fication
Modification of the formatting structure
used to store SALT references (privacy and
accountability related information) into a
given repository
SALT authority
Creation of a SALT
framework reference
Creation and storage (within a repository)
of a standard SALT framework reference
Standards body
Extension of a SALT
framework reference
Extension and storage (within a repository)
of a standard SALT framework reference
Standards body
Creation of a SALT
framework project ref-
erence (SFPR)
Creation and storage (within a repository)
of a SALT framework project reference (ref-








Delivery of technical components capabili-
ties
Technology provider
Note that we envision that at the beginning, the experts who initialise the
SALT framework will assume the role of SALT authority. The Standards body
could also be called “standards committee”, which refers to persons with sufficient
knowledge to create a SALT framework reference. They can be considered as
experts in social-contextual, ethical, legal and technical concerns.
Based on the use cases specification, we use an activity diagram to show
the interactions between the actors and their actions within the SALTed design
process. The activity diagram in Fig. 3 depicts all actors and how their roles are






























Fig. 3. Activity diagram for a SALTed design process
related. In general, the following activities can be involved in a SALTed design
process:
– First, a SALT template is created if it does not yet exist. If the SALT template
is already available, it is necessary to check whether the template needs to
be updated according to the new information that is going to be included in
the repository. Therefore, the template will be updated when needed.
– Second, information is collected according to the fields specified in the tem-
plate. As the template is a part of the SALT knowledge repository, the
repository is populated with related knowledge by various actors. For ex-
ample, the standard body can either create or extend existing knowledge,
update and store this information, i.e. SALTed Framework Instances (SFIs),
into the repository. The project stakeholder can specify system requirements
(considered as high level system specifications), create and store this informa-
tion, i.e. SALT framework project instances (SFPIs), into the repository. In
addition, the technology provider can provide information on their component
capabilities.
– Third, the system designer acquires the relevant information produced in the
second step. Besides, the system designer can also include domain specific
privacy knowledge represented as Domain Privacy Models (DPMs) in the
SALT framework. A system design is created by the system designer. At first,
a required system design without the SALT information is generated. Taking
into account SALT information, then the system designer converts the design
to a SALT compliant design. A final deployed system design is produced
according to component capabilities and deployment scenarios. Note that the
system design can be an iterative process.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a multidisciplinary approach to take into account privacy
in the design of video surveillance systems. The SALT framework is a set of
concepts, overarching principles, and knowledge relative to the social-contextual,
ethical, legal, and technical aspects of surveillance, as well as concepts related to
privacy-by-design and accountability-by-design. With the associated processes,
the SALT framework serves as a decision support to assist system designer and
other stakeholders in coping with complex privacy requirements in a systematic
and methodological way.
The work performed so far has concentrated on the design of an architecture
for the SALT Framework and reining the vision of the project. The forthcoming
challenges include giving an adequate representation of social knowledge in a
computer-readable format, as well as the development of tools to access, update
and use the stored knowledge. The project aims at testing the methodology in
two different settings: the design of a video surveillance system and a biometric
system.
The approach presented here stems from the ongoing PrivAcy pReserving
Infrastructure for Surveillance (PARIS) project [2]. The project gives us a unique
opportunity to work together with researchers and engineers from different disci-
plines and backgrounds to address privacy in surveillance in a coherent way. Our
interaction underlines contrasting approaches to privacy, even among consortium
partners. This convinces us that a multidisciplinary approach, although some-
times difficult, is fruitful to systematically address privacy and cross-boundary
issues.
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